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Abstract
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rms are widespread but di¢ cult to uncover, making whistleblow-
ing by employees desirable. We investigate if and how monetary incentives and expectations of social
approval or disapproval from the public, and their interactions, a¤ect an employees decision to blow
the whistle when the social damage from the reported misbehavior is more or less salient. Our analysis
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rmsinternal whistleblowing channels.
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1 Introduction
Corporate fraud is widespread around the world. A recent survey of over 6000 organizations across
115 countries (2016 Global Crime Survey)1 shows that one in three organizations, both worldwide and
in the US, experienced fraud in the past 24 months, prevalently in the form of asset misappropriation,
cybercrime, corruption, as well as procurement and accounting fraud. About 35% of the surveyed rms
reported fraud-related losses exceeding $100,000, and 14% of rms reported losses above $1 million.2
Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2013) estimated that between 1996 and 2004, about 15% of large3 publicly
traded US corporations engaged in fraud. The estimated expected annual cost of fraud for these rms
amounts to a staggering $380 billion.
Due to their informational advantage, employees could potentially play a crucial role in uncovering
illegal behavior and initiating internal or external investigations. However, while particular cases of
whistleblowing have garnered the attention of the popular press in recent years, from the Enron scandal
to the Snowden and Wikileaks-related cases, whistleblowing by employees is actually uncommon. Dyck,
Morse and Zingales (2010) analyze 216 securities class action lawsuits led against large US corporations
and nd that only about 18% of them were brought forward by an employee. Given the high costs
associated with blowing the whistle ranging from coworkersdisapproval and ostracism to lack of career
advancement, job loss and outright harassment (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994; Rothschild and Miethe, 1999)
this rarity is unsurprising.4 Psychological costs caused by conicting moral norms loyalty toward the
rm on the one hand, and fairness or justice concerns on the other may also make employees reluctant
to report wrongdoing taking place within their organization (Gundlach et al. 2003; Liu et al., 2018;
Waytz, Dungan and Young, 2013). Fear of media scrutiny or public disapproval might further reduce
employeeswillingness to blow the whistle. Alternatively, if the expectation is of public approval, media
or public scrutiny might actually increase whistleblowing, a possibility we discuss below.
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent policies that might motivate
individuals to report illegal activities taking place within an organization. We focus on both monetary
and non-monetary incentives. In particular, we ask whether whistleblowers should be nancially rewarded
and whether they should be shielded from media scrutiny and social judgment. Moreover, we ask whether
di¤erent sectors or di¤erent kinds of fraud require di¤erent policies, depending on whether the social costs
generated by fraud are or are not visible and salient to the public consider Medicare fraud versus insider
trading as suggested by recent legal theory (e.g., Engstrom, 2014b).
Monetary incentives for whistleblowing are the subject of an ongoing and contentious debate, inten-
sied by the nancial crisis of 2008. On the one hand, in 2010 the US enacted the Dodd-Frank Act that,
among other things, allowed whistleblowers to receive nancial bounties for bringing information to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).5
1https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf
2Taking into account that most cases of fraud go undetected and that rms self-selecting into a global crime survey
are likely to be cleaner than those selecting out, the above numbers undoubtedly underestimate the current state of the
corporate world.
3Large is dened by having assets exceeding $750 million.
4Many of these forms of retaliation  including, for example, lack of promotion  are su¢ ciently opaque to escape
whistleblower protection laws, and the Ethics Resource Center (2014) reports a steady increase across time in the percentage
of whistleblowers facing retaliation,even when whistleblowing is internal to the rm..
5The US is a pioneer in the enactment on laws and provisions that protect and reward whistleblowers. In 1986, the
US strengthened provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), originally passed by Congress in 1863 and signed by President
Abraham Lincoln to ght government fraud, allowing among other things for the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions. It
allows any individual or non-governmental organization to le an FCA lawsuit on behalf of the US Government and, if
successful, to obtain up to 30% of recoveries plus nes. Another early whistleblower reward scheme targeting tax evasion is
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On the other hand, across the Atlantic, regulatory agencies remain strongly opposed to nancially re-
warding whistleblowers,6 even though US agencies consider them a great success7 and the available
empirical research (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales, 2010) suggests that they are indeed e¤ective motivators
of whistleblowing.8
The issue of protecting corporate whistleblowers from social judgment has not yet been examined
by law-makers or the media, but we think it is an important one to address, given its potential impact
on individualswillingness to report illegal acts.9 In fact, a vast theoretical and experimental literature
has shown that individualsbehavior is highly responsive to the possibility of social observability and
judgment (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Ariely et al., 2009; Benabou
and Tirole, 2006; Carpenter and Myer, 2010; Gerber et al., 2008; Linardi and McConnell, 2011; Xiao
and Houser, 2011), therefore suggesting that public scrutiny is likely to have a signicant e¤ect on
whistleblowing. However, should we expect this e¤ect to be positive or negative? The answer may
depend on how whistleblowers expect to be judged by the public: will they be seen as snitches or as
heroes? This may in turn hinge on how salient the social costs of manager malfeasance are to the public.
For instance, in 1971 economist Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon papers concerning US involvement
in Vietnam. He is widely viewed as a hero, which may be in part due to the salience of the (literal,
physical) public harm associated with this controversial war. Public opinion is much more divided on
Edward Snowden, who is seen by few as a hero and by many as a traitor. Perhaps not coincidentally, the
public harm revealed by Snowden is more di¤use, distant and di¢ cult to quantify.
An additional factor that may a¤ect how whistleblowers are (or expect to be) perceived by the public
is the presence of nancial rewards. If whistleblowers get remunerated for their reporting, this may change
(their expectations of) the public judgment of their actions, turning them from heroes to greedy snitches.
In other words, nancial rewards may crowd out non-monetary motivations driven by expectations of
social approval (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Therefore, the impact of nancial rewards on whistleblowing
may be lower, perhaps even turning negative, in the presence of social judgment (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000b). Studying how nancial rewards and expectations of social approval or disapproval interact in
incentivizing (or discouraging) whistleblowing is therefore important and is one of the primary aims of
our study.
In order to identify the impact of nancial rewards and social judgment, and their interaction, on
whistleblowing in a controlled setting where we can carefully measure individualswillingness to report
corporate wrongdoing, we employ a novel framed laboratory experiment that simulates the relationships
between employees and managers within a rm. In our basic set-up, managers have the chance to engage
the one run by the IRS, which was substantially strengthened in 2006.
6 In the UK, for example, the Bank of Englands Prudential Supervision Authority and the Financial Conduct Authorities
gave a joint, strongly negative response in 2014 to a request for opinion from the UK parliament on nancially rewarding
whistleblowers, even arguing (incorrectly) that there was no empirical evidence of incentives leading to an increase in the
number or quality of disclosures (see Nyrerod and Spagnolo 2018).
7The SEC reported in 2015 that they received 4000 tips from whistleblowers, an increase of 30% from 2012, with steady
growth since 2011 probably resulting from increased awareness of the law. According to the IRS, their whistleblower program
has helped to recover $3 billion since 2007, with $343 million recovered in 2013 and $310 million in 2014 (IRS, 2015).
8Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) calculated that in sectors where the False Claim Act does not allow employees to
obtain a nancial reward, corporate fraud is unveiled by employees in 14% of the cases, while this percentage more than
doubles (to 41%) when the False Claim Act can be applied, a highly signicant di¤erence. A series of articles published
in top law journals (Engstrom, 2012, 2013, 2014a) also show empirically that several concerns about distortions linked to
the False Claim Act are not justied in the light of the available data. Evidence on the (rather positive) e¤ects of the
whistleblower rewards linked to the Dodd-Frank Act is in Call et al. (2017), and Wilde (2017).
9There does not seem to be a consensus on whether the identity of whistleblowers should be safeguarded from the
media and, more generally, the public. For instance, in the US, investigations conducted by the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) protect the identity of whistleblowers, whereas investigations conducted under the False Claim Act
expose whistleblowers by requiring them to le a court case.
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in law-breaking behavior to benet themselves and their employees at the expense of other subjects
playing the role of members of the public. Employees, who are not victims but rather beneciaries of the
managers illicit behavior, are given the option of blowing the whistle on their manager. Whistleblowing
is costly for the employee and leads to the automatic imposition of a monetary penalty on the manager.
Across treatments, we manipulate the presence of both nancial rewards for, and social judgment
of, whistleblowers. In particular, in some treatments whistleblowing entails a net monetary cost to the
employee, while in other treatments whistleblowing engenders a net nancial gain. To test whether
non-monetary motives such as aversion to social disapproval or desire for social approval play a role
in whistleblowing, in some treatments potential whistleblowers are informed that participants assigned
the role of member of the public are allowed to send costless judgmental messages  in the form of
smiley or frowny faces to employees who choose to blow the whistle. To induce variation in employees
expectations of positive or negative public judgment, we also manipulate across treatments whether
members of the public are aware of the costs imposed on them by manager malfeasance. This variation
also allows us to investigate whether nancial rewards and social judgment, and their interaction, have
a di¤erent impact on whistleblowing, and therefore are more or less desirable when applied to di¤erent
kinds of fraud or di¤erent industries.
Our investigation also o¤ers guidance for rmsinternal whistleblowing policies, where top manage-
ment is interested in nding out about possible misbehavior by lower ranked division managers.10 In
fact, our game could easily be reinterpreted as one where a division manager can illegally enhance his
or her units performance while putting co-workers in other units (the public) at risk of legal action and
reputation loss. In this setting, nancial rewards would be wage raises or promotions, and social judg-
ment could be implemented (prevented) by disclosing (protecting) the whistleblowers identity to (from)
co-workers.
2 Literature Review
While there exist a number of theoretical economic analyses of whistleblowing (Spagnolo, 2004; Aubert
et al., 2006; Friebel and Guriev, 2012; Felli and Hortala-Vallve, 2016; Heyes and Kapur, 2009; and Givati,
2016), empirical studies are rare and typically su¤er from fundamental measurement and identication
challenges, as only illegal behavior that has been uncovered and only whistles that have been blown can be
observed. Consequently, existing studies focus on either the infringements that have been discovered (e.g.,
Dyck et al., 2010) or use scenario-based survey data (e.g., Feldman and Lobel, 2010). The management
literature has employed models and surveys to identify the personality and situational variables predictive
of whistle-blowing (e.g. Dozier and Miceli, 1985; Near and Miceli, 1995; Gundlach et a., 2003; Miceli et al.,
2012). For instance, recent work by Lui et al. (2018) highlights the importance of employeesidentication
with the organization together with the ethical culture in the organization and personality traits as
predictive of whistleblowing.11
10The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the new proposed EU Directive on Whistleblowers require rms to establish policies to
elicit employeeswrongdoing through internal whistleblowing, which may allow managers to uncover and correct employees
malpractices and reduce the potentially large legal and reputation costs of having malpractices uncovered by regulators. Of
course this is a delicate point, as when the malpractice is induced by top management, internal whistleblowing policies may
be misused for cover-upsand reduce rmscost of misbehaving (see e.g. Felli and Hortala-Vallve, 2016).
11The management literature recognized early on that whistleblowing may enable organizational leaders to correct prac-
tices that may harm the organization and is therefore desirable. However, to our knowledge, management and organizational
studies have not considered the importance of pecuniary factors, nor that of social approval or of the visibility of the neg-
ative externalities caused by fraud, in incentivizing (or disincentivizing) employeeswillingness to blow the whistle against
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The measurement and identication issues that make empirical investigations of whistleblowing prob-
lematic have led to a recent surge of experimental studies on the factors that may induce employees to
blow the whistle against malfeasance. Laboratory experiments are particularly valuable, as they allow
researchers to directly observe both wrongdoing and whistleblowing, and to measure responsiveness to
changes in incentives in a controlled environment.
One of the rst whistleblower experiments is by Reuben and Stephenson (2013), who examine indi-
vidualswillingness to report team members after observing them cheat while knowing that blowing the
whistle would cause the whole group to be penalized. More recently, Carpenter et al. (2017) experimen-
tally investigate peer reporting within a rm and nd that sharing prots with employees may e¤ectively
incentivize individuals to blow the whistle against shirking co-workers.
Bartuli et al. (2016) study whistleblowing in an experimental context that is closer to ours, i.e. a
setting where: i) the potential whistleblower is an employee that benets from the wrongdoing of the
manager; ii) such wrongdoing generates losses to a third party; and iii) blowing the whistle is costly.
However, while we are interested in testing policies aimed at incentivizing whistleblowing, Bartuli et al.
(2016) aim to identify personality traits that are more likely to lead to whistleblowing.12 Similarly, Waytz
et al. (2013) use survey questions to investigate the relationship between propensity to blow the whistle
and a specic individual trait: the subjective valuation of fairness/justice over loyalty.
The experimental study most closely related to ours is by Schmolke and Utikal (2016), who investigate
whistleblowing in a neutrally framed environment where one subject may increase his payo¤ at the cost
of increasing inequality among other players who can then report this behavior to a third subject, the
potential whistleblower. Blowing the whistle leads to punishment and redistribution of payo¤s to restore
initial conditions. The authors study the e¤ects of rewards for, versus nes for not, blowing the whistle
and nd that even modest monetary rewards increase the probability of whistleblowing. While the
experiment has other interesting treatments,13 it does not investigate the role that expectations of social
approval or disapproval may play in the whistleblowing decision, and how they may interact with nancial
incentives.
More tangentially related to our study is the well-developed literature on whistleblowing in the
context of illegal cartel formation among rms. Apesteguia, Dufwenberg and Selten (2007) were the
rst to study leniency and rewards to whistleblowers in an experiment on illegal cartel formation in the
context of static Bertrand competition. Their results suggest that rewarding whistleblowers increases the
likelihood of whistleblowing without reducing market prices. In a repeated game version of an analogous
experiment, Bigoni et al. (2012) nd that o¤ering a monetary reward to the rst whistleblower leads to
high reporting rates that strongly deter cartel formation as predicted by theory (Spagnolo 2004, 2008). A
number of other experimental studies focus on the e¤ectiveness of leniency policies providing amnesty or
asymmetric legal treatment to accomplice-witnesses that blow the whistle against collusion without the
use of monetary rewards, including Hamaguchi et al. (2009), Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008), Bigoni et
al. (2015), and Cotten and Santore (2016).
Somewhat less directly related to our study is also another growing strand of experimental litera-
ture that investigates whistleblowing in the context of corrupt transactions between public o¢ cials and
observed malfeasance.
12They nd that employees who are more altruistic and more concerned about ethical issues are more likely to blow the
whistle. For survey-based studies of personality and whistleblowing, see also Miceli and Near (1992, 1994) and Feldman
and Lobel (2010).
13They manipulate whether and how the reporting subject and the enforcing authority are positively or negatively a¤ected
by the rst subjects decision.
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citizens/rms. For instance, Abbink and Wu (2017) simulate both one-shot and repeated transactions
between rms and public o¢ cials where rms can obtain illegal services through the payment of a bribe.
They nd that whistleblower amnesty and monetary rewards strongly deter illegal transactions in a one-
shot setting, but that deterrence is limited in repeated relationships. Abbink et al. (2014), Buckenmaieret
et al. (2017), Schikora (2011) and Serra (2012) nd similar results with amnesty alone.14
In sum, the existing experimental literature whether it simulates a rm environment, illegal cartel
formation or corrupt transactions has mainly focused on the e¤ect of nancial rewards and/or amnesty
on the propensity to report wrongdoing, or on the deterrence e¤ects of whistleblowing on wrongdoing.
While we also investigate the e¤ect of nancial rewards on whistleblowing, our main contribution to
the literature is threefold. First and foremost, we examine how non-monetary motivations in the form of
expectations of public approval or disapproval a¤ect the propensity to blow the whistle against somebody
that is in a position of power and whose law-breaking beneted the potential whistleblower. This is a
largely unexplored question. In fact, while there is a growing literature on how social observability and
judgment a¤ect behavior (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Ariely et al.,
2009; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Gerber et al., 2008; Linardi and McConnell, 2011; Salmon and Serra,
2017; Xiao and Houser, 2011; see also the overview provided by Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017), to the best
of our knowledge there are no studies investigating the relationship between whistleblowing and public
judgment. This is an important relationship, as the results of our analysis have the potential to inform
policy about whether and in what contexts protecting whistleblowers from public scrutiny is desirable.
Second, we ask whether di¤erent kinds of wrongdoing, possibly taking place in di¤erent industries, require
di¤erent kinds of policies. In particular, we di¤erentiate between cases of fraud generating negative
externalities to society that are easily visible to the public and cases of fraud involving social costs that
are less transparent or salient to the public, and consider whether the e¤ects of nancial and non-nancial
incentives di¤er across these contexts. Finally, our study sheds light on whether nancial rewards may
be less e¤ective if whistleblowers are exposed to public/media scrutiny, i.e., whether they may induce the
public to view whistleblowers more as snitches than as heroes.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Design
The experimental session consists of six stages, as shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of the experiment
(Stage 0), participants are randomly assigned either the role of member of a rmor the role of member
of the public.Each rm is made of three subjects, and while multiple rms participate in each session,
rms operate independently from each other. In other words, there is no interaction between rms and
the payo¤s of each rm member are determined solely by the actions that take place within their rm.
There are 6 participants playing as members of the public, i.e., double the number of the members of any
given rm. This is to recreate in the lab the standard case where the societythat may be negatively
a¤ected by corporate fraud is larger than the rm engaging in it.
Following the role assignment stage, the experiment begins and it comprises of 4 active stages (Stages
1 to 4 in Figure 1), only one of which is randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experimental
14Breuer (2013) studies the e¤ects of nancial rewards for whistleblowers in a laboratory experiment on tax evasion and
nds a strong positive e¤ect of rewards on subjectswillingness to blow the whistle on the tax declaration of another subject
and little evidence of crowding out of non-monetary motivations.
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Figure 1: The stages of the experimental session
session. In Stage 5, subjects participate in a brief post-experiment survey.
Since loyalty to the rm and to ones manager is an important feature of work within organizations
and a potential obstacle to the decision to report wrongdoing (Waytz et al., 2013), Stage One was designed
to induce a sense of identity and social cohesion among each rms members. In this stage, the three
members of each rm engage in a series of team-building tasks with interdependent payo¤s to create a
sense of shared fate,a feature which has been shown to induce a common identity (Ashforth and Mael,
1989). The rst task is the Kandinsky and Klee painting elicitation module rst developed in Tajfel
et al. (1971), in which subjects view a series of paintings and guess whether each of them is a Klee
or a Kandinsky. Each individual gets credit if at least one member of the rm guesses correctly. The
second task consists of a series of addition problems. As before, each member of the rm earns money
for each problem that at least one member of the rm solves correctly. The third task involves a series of
multiplication problems, each of which involves multiplying two two-digit numbers. Individual payo¤s are
determined as in the previous team-building tasks. The members of the public engage in the same three
tasks but their payo¤s are determined exclusively by their own performance. At the end of each task,
rm members are informed of their own performance and the overall rm performance, which generates
their earnings. Members of the public are informed only of their own performance.
Stage Two consists of a one-shot minimum-e¤ort coordination game aimed at testing whether Stage
One resulted in the desired within-rm cohesion. Each member of a rm plays the game with the other
two members, while each member of the public plays the game with two other members of the public.
Participants choose a level of e¤ort between 110 and 170, with their payo¤s being determined by the
di¤erence between the minimum e¤ort chosen in the group and their own e¤ort multiplied by 0.75.15
Subjects are not informed of the outcome of this game and the resulting earnings until the end of the
experimental session. If the identity-building task conducted in Stage 1 was successful, we would expect
the minimum e¤ort chosen by rm members to be higher than the minimum e¤ort chosen by members
of the public (since the latter did not engage in the identity-building task among themselves).
In Stage Three, participants play the Whistleblowing Game. Subjects retain the role of either
member of the rm or member of the public. Within each rm, one participant is randomly chosen to
be the managerand the remaining two participants are assigned the role of employees.16 By having
15We chose the minimum e¤ort game as we wanted a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. Chen and Chen (2011) have recently shown that, in the context of the minimum e¤ort game, induced
group identity increases the e¤ort levels chosen by the group members, facilitating coordination on the e¢ cient high-e¤ort
equilibrium.
16We chose the role allocation to be done randomly rather than based on individual performance in stage one as we
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two employees of identical status and a manager, we aim to simulate most organizational set-ups where
multiple individuals have the same tasks and respond to the same high-ranked supervisor or manager.17
The employees engage in a real-e¤ort task consisting of adding two-digit numbers, as in task two of
Stage One of the experiment. Each correct answer generates private earnings at a piece rate of 2 ECU
and also contributes to a rm fund at a piece rate of 1 ECU.18 There are a total of 12 problems per
employee, resulting in maximum private earnings of 24 ECU per employee and a maximum rm fund
of, also, 24 ECU. The rm fund is later distributed back to the manager (one half of the fund) and the
employees (one fourth each).
The manager gets a xed wage of 24 ECU and has the chance to double the rms fund by engaging
in a more di¢ cult real-e¤ort task (multiplying two-digit numbers, as in task three of Stage One of the
experiment) and answering at least eight of the 12 problems correctly. Alternatively, the manager can
augment the fund by breaking the law.The manager is informed that breaking the law generates money
for the rm but causes a monetary loss of 2 ECU to each of the six members of the public. Our payo¤
conguration implies that, as in real organizations, the manager always makes more money than the
employees,19 and his or her performance, whether through legal or illegal practices, may add signicant
value to the rm and therefore benet the employees.
As before, members of the public are only involved in individual decision-making. They have an
initial endowment of 14 ECU and, like the employees, engage in a real-e¤ort task consisting of adding
two-digit numbers. The task generates 2 ECU for each correct answer. However, their nal earnings
also depend on the rule-breaking choice of the managers of the rms in the session, since each managers
wrongdoing causes a loss of 2 ECU to each member of the public. This implies that the total loss su¤ered
by each member of the public ranges from a minimum of 0 (if all managers in the session decide not to
break the law) to a maximum of (2xN) if all the managers of the N rms in the session with N ranging
from 2 to 6, depending on session size decide to break the law.
Note that the decision to break the law would be socially e¢ cient only if the manager were not
able to augment the fund by successfully completing the multiplication task and if the rm fund were
larger than 12 ECU. If the employees jointly generate a rm fund of 12 ECU, law-breaking behavior by
a low-ability manager would generate a rm surplus of 12 ECU while also generating a societal loss of
12 ECU. A high-ability managers decision to break the law is always socially ine¢ cient. This is because
a high-ability manager would always be able to solve the multiplication task correctly, thus generating
the rm surplus without any negative externalities on society. In order to keep the managers decision to
break the law comparable across rms and independent of e¢ ciency concerns, we do not reveal the size
of the rm fund to the manager before eliciting his or her decision to break the law.
We measure employeeswillingness to blow the whistle by using the strategy elicitation method.
We ask each employee within a rm whether they would blow the whistle if they found out that their
manager broke the law. Blowing the whistle requires the employee to pay a monetary cost of 5 ECU and
imposes a monetary penalty of 14 ECU on a law-breaking manager. Whistleblowing confers no direct
benet to members of the public. In particular, it cannot o¤set the monetary harm imposed on them
wanted to have enough variation in CEOsdecisions to break the law. Since such a decision is likely to be correlated with
CEOs ability, role allocation by merit would have likely resulted in low frequency of law breaking.
17We also aimed to reduce each employees competitive feelings and inequality aversion toward the manager.
18Experimental currency units (ECU) were exchanged for dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of 2 ECU per
$1, as described below.
19Note that the managers wage equals the private earnings of the employee if the employee is highly productive, i.e. he
or she solves all 12 problems correctly. Even in this case, the manager ends up with higher earnings, since he or she receives
half of the rm fund versus the one-fourth received by the employee.
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by manager malfeasance. Our primary rationale for this design choice is to mirror real-world situations
where the public is not fully compensated for the harm caused by rm misbehavior, either because of
transactions costs of prosecution, such as delays in adjudication or legal fees, or because it is di¢ cult to
perfectly assess precisely who the victims are.
Our choice of the strategy method balanced several considerations. Using the strategy method
allows us to observe employeeswillingness to blow the whistle even in situations where rule-breaking
does not actually occur. This confers two advantages. First, we avoid selection issues which complicate
empirical analyses of data when observations are missing non-randomly. A second advantage is sample
size. Essentially, had reporting been directly elicited, each employees whistleblowing decision would have
been conditional on the actual occurrence of law-breaking, compromising comparability across employees
and resulting in fewer data points. The primary disadvantage of the strategy method is external validity.
In real life situations, the decision to blow the whistle may often be hotrather cold particularly when
it is made immediately after the observation of manager wrongdoing, as it is in our experiment. Since
the strategy method requires decisions to be made before law-breaking has actually occurred, it may
not capture visceral which can a¤ect hotdecisions in the real world. While we took this disadvantage
seriously, our concerns were partially allayed by a recent study examining dozens of studies to compare
results using the direct-response method with results using the strategy method which concluded ...
in no case do we nd that a treatment e¤ect found with the strategy method is not observed with the
direct-response method (Brandts and Charness, 2011). An earlier study by the same authors found
no di¤erence in positive (rewarding) or negative (punishing) responses to others behavior across the
direct-response and strategy methods (Brandts and Charness, 2000).
We compute nal earnings within a rm by randomly choosing one of the two employees in the rm
and implementing the stated whistleblowing decision conditional on the matched managers behavior.
With this design choice, we purposely abstract from the potential presence of collective action problems
in the decision to blow the whistle and from the need to control for subject behavior and expectations
in such a strategic situation. These aspects have been analyzed in other contexts (see, e.g., Bigoni et
al. 2012, 2015) and would have increased complexity and noise in the measuring of the e¤ects we are
interested in here.
Stage Four concludes the remunerated portion of the experiment with a minimum-e¤ort coordination
game identical to the game subjects played in stage two. We included this stage with the purpose of
possibly identifying the e¤ects of the decisions made in the whistleblowing game  i.e., the managers
law-breaking decision and the employeesreporting decisions on rm cohesion.
In Stage Five, after participating in the experiment, subjects ll out a survey. As part of the survey,
all subjects are presented with four actual whistleblowing cases that di¤er both in the extent to which
the negative externalities caused by the illegal behavior are visible to the public and in the presence of
nancial rewards for whistleblowers. The four cases are the Snowden case, the Enron case, the UBS
case and the Tenet case.20 We chose these cases because the visibility of negative externalities varies
substantially across the cases, as do the nancial incentives for the whistleblowers involved.
20For information on the Snowden case, see: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistle-
blower.html?_r=0. For the Enron case, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5335214.stm. For the UBS case,
see: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444017504577645412614237708. For information on the Tenet
case, see: http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/tenet-healthcare-to-pay-514-million-gets-non-prosecution-
agreement-two-units-with-no-assets-to-plead-guilty.
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3.2 Treatments
We employ three treatment variations by manipulating the presence of nancial rewards for whistleblow-
ers, whether whistleblowers are exposed to social judgment, and whether the members of the public are
aware of the negative externalities that the managers illegal actions generate on them.
1. Reward vs. No Reward : In the No Reward condition, whistleblowing employees bear a cost of 5
ECU, while in the Reward condition an employee that blows the whistle against his or her manager
also receives a nancial reward of 10 ECU (i.e., whistleblowing results in a net nancial gain of
5 ECU for the employee). All participants in the game. i.e., managers, employees and members
of the public, are made aware of the cost associated with whistleblowing as well as the nancial
reward (in the Reward treatment).
2. Social Judgment vs. No Social Judgment : Under Social Judgment, members of the public are given
the chance to send messages of approval or disapproval to whistleblowers. Similarly to Carpenter
and Seki, 2011) and Salmon and Serra (2017), these messages take the form of a smiley face, a
frowny face or a neutral face. Each member of the public can also choose to send no message at
all to whistleblowers.21 Sending a message comes at no cost to the member of the public and does
not lead to any monetary reward or penalty for the whistleblower. Crucially, employees are also
informed, before they make their reporting decision, that each member of the public will be able
to send one of these messages to an employee who chooses to blow the whistle. By contrast, in the
No Social Judgment treatment, the public is informed of whistleblowing but cannot send messages
of any kind to the whistleblower.22
3. Visible vs. Invisible Externalities: Under Visible Externalities, all experimental participants (i.e.,
managers, employees and members of the public) are told that the members of the public will be
made aware of the monetary losses they su¤er (or could su¤er) due to each managers illegal actions.
In other words, all subjects are informed about the exact payo¤ conguration resulting from the
game, i.e., the members of the public know that, in addition of their initial endowment, they earn
2 ECU for each problem they solve correctly, and they lose 2 ECU for each manager that engages
in law-breaking. In contrast, under Invisible Externalities the members of the public are informed
that managers of rms can engage in wrongdoing, and they are told whether they did or did not
at the end of the session, but they do not know that such wrongdoing a¤ects their own earnings
negatively. We achieve this by not disclosing to members of the public exactly how much they
could earn from each correctly solved problem while they engage in the task. We tell them that
they will earn money for the task and will be informed how much they made at the end. Managers
and employees are aware that under Invisible Externalities the members of the public do not know
about the monetary losses that they may su¤er due to managerslaw-breaking behavior.
21Carpenter nd Seki (2011) were the rst to use messages showing unhappy faces to signal social disapproval. Salmon
and Serra (2017) expanded on this methodology by allowing participants to signal either approval or disapproval through
messages displaying happy, unhappy or neutral faces.
22Note that we are not allowing the co-worker or the manager to send messages of approval or disapproval to the
whistleblower. We omitted this possibility not because we believe the judgement from direct co-workers to be unimportant or
uninteresting (although this would partly the case for the judgement from the reported manager), but to avoid an additional
complication and potential source of variation in beliefs that might have confused the answer to the core questions of our
paper, i.e., the e¤ects of social judgement from the more distant public, and its interaction with visibility of the externality
and nancial incentives.
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Invisible Externalities Visible Externalities Total
Treatments Sessions Subjects Sessions Subjects Sessions Subjects
No Rewards & No Judgment 4 63 3 51 7 69
No Rewards & Social Judgment 3 51 3 60 6 75
Rewards & No Judgment 4 75 3 54 7 96
Rewards & Social Judgment 3 48 4 69 7 84
Total 14 234 13 237 27 471
Table 1: Summary of experimental sessions and treatments.
The interactions between our three treatment manipulations generate eight experimental conditions,
as shown in Table 1.
3.3 Implementation
We conducted 27 sessions involving 471 participants at the University of California, Santa Barbaras
Experimental and Behavioral Economics laboratory (EBEL), as shown in Table 1. Each subject partic-
ipated in only one session and one treatment. In each session, 6 subjects were randomly assigned the
role of members of the public (MPs) and between 6 and 18 subjects were randomly assigned the role of
members of a rm, for a total of between 3 and 6 rms per session. Members of each rm made decisions
independently from all the other rms participating in a session.
In referring to subject roles, the experimental environment and available actions, we used the same
contextual labels we used in Section 3.1 when describing the game. We chose to implement a framed
experiment because, as recently discussed in Alekseev, Charness and Gneezy (2016), psychological and
social factors may play a signicant role in individualsdecisions to engage in and report on unlawful
behavior and, in such situations, framing may help subjects more fully understand the decision-making
context.23
The experiment consisted of an initial role-assignment stage, followed by four active stages plus a
survey. Subjects were presented with the instructions for each stage on their computer screen immedi-
ately before that stage began. Only one randomly selected stage of the experiment was used for actual
payments. Experimental earnings were converted from ECUs to dollars at the exchange rate of $1 for 2
ECU. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited among
pre-registered UCSB students using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). In order to guarantee anonymity, at the
beginning of each session subjects were randomly assigned an identication number, which they kept for
the duration of the experiment. At no point during the experiment did we ask subjects to reveal their
names and, although actual names were used during the payment process for accounting purposes, we
informed subjects that we would not register their names and therefore would not be able to link them
to the choices made in the experiment. Each session lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, with average
earnings of $29 per subject (including a $10 show-up fee).
23Framing e¤ects have been found in a large set of pro-social games, including public goods games (Andreoni, 1995;
Cookson 2000; Rege and Telle 2004; among the others) and dictator games (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Brañas-Garza,
2007). For a recent study of how frames signicantly a¤ect rst- and second-order beliefs, see Dufwenberg, Gächter, and
Hennig-Schmidt (2011). Alekseev, Charness and Gneezy (2016) provide a recent review of experiments employing either
abstract or meaningful frames to present the decision-making setting to the experimental subjects. Their general nding is
that evocative language either does not a¤ect behavior or a¤ects it in a desirable way by evoking the desired emotional
response.
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3.4 Hypotheses
A wide array of motivations may inuence individualspreferences and decisions. Our reading of the
existing whistleblowing literature suggests three which are likely to be particularly important: monetary
incentives, personal moral concerns and a preference for social approval. By varying the presence of
nancial whistlblower rewards, the possibility of social judgement and whether the negative externalities
imposed by misbehaving managers are visible to the public, our experimental treatments were designed
to manipulate these three motivations in transparent ways. To provide a point of departure in thinking
about how these manipulations may a¤ect whistleblowing, in Section A of the Appendix we construct a
simple framework explicitly incorporating monetary incentives, moral concerns and preferences for social
approval into whistleblowersutility. By making assumptions about how our treatments a¤ect these three
motivations, we use the framework to illustrate how our treatments may a¤ect employee whistleblowing.
Our framework allows us to formulate three broad hypotheses.
The simplest case assumes that each of the motivations nancial, moral and social are independent
of one another. Note that this implies nancial incentives cannot crowd outnon-nancial incentives
in the sense of directly altering the moral or social utility consequences of whistleblowing. Absent such
crowding out, our rst prediction is straightforward:
Hypothesis 1 Financial rewards will increase the likelihood that an employee will blow the whistle.
Whether this hypothesis will be supported or not in the data is not a priori obvious. As discussed
in the introduction, there is widespread concern, partly related to previous experimental work, that
nancial rewards might crowd out intrinsic pro-social incentives to blow the whistle, those based on
the expectations of social judgement, or both. In principle, we might therefore observe a decrease in the
frequency of whistleblowing following the introduction of nancial incentives. We return to this possibility
below.
As mentioned, the other main focus of our analysis is the role of social judgement. With respect
to social judgment, we assume that the public is more likely to perceive whistleblowing as a pro-social
act when it is aware of the harm associated with manager misbehavior. Intuitively, when members of
the public are aware that they are being harmed by the rm, they are more likely to want the manager
to be punished and, consequently, to socially reward the whistleblower for triggering such punishment.
If, instead, the public does not feel directly a¤ected by the managers wrongdoing, it is possible that it
will perceive the whistleblower as somebody who decided to run afoul of the widespread moral norm of
group loyalty24 and commit an anti-social act, leading to social disapproval. In other words, the visibility
of the negative externalities to the public is likely to a¤ect whistleblowersbeliefs about how they will
be perceived and judged by the public if they do blow the whistle, i.e., as heroes if the externalities are
visible and as snitches if they are not visible. These assumptions lead to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Allowing for social judgment will decrease whistleblowing in our Invisible Externalities
treatments relative to our Visible Externalities treatments.
24 In our discussion, we are abstracting from the concerns that individuals may have about the social judgment that they
would receive from their fellow rm members. A plausible assumption is that employees prefer to appear loyal to fellow rm
members while also wanting to appear pro-social to members of the public, especially if they are subject to public judgment.
When the negative externalities caused by fraud are visible to the public, loyalty toward rm members and preferences
for social approval from members of the public pull employees in di¤erent directions. When the negative externalities are
invisible to the public, both motivations steer employees away from blowing the whistle.
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Until now, we have been putting aside one of the key questions of our inquiry: whether and how
nancial incentives and social judgement interact in a¤ecting the decision to blow the whistle. Whether
or not a whistleblower receives a nancial reward may obviously a¤ect the way the public perceives the
whistleblower, or how the whistleblower expects to be perceived and judged by the public, which is what
ultimately matters for eliciting whistleblowing. The fact of being paid for blowing the whistle may, for
example, reduce the perceived ethical value of the act and induce the public to see the whistleblower
more as a snitch than as a hero. We turn now to this question.
For our next hypothesis we focus on our Visible Externalities treatments where we have just argued
that social judgment should increase whistleblowing. Now, however, we relax the assumption of motiva-
tion independence. This permits a simple form of crowding out. In particular, if potential whistleblowers
believe that monetary rewards will directly negatively impact the publics opinion of whistleblowers, then
the whistleblower will expect less social approval when there are rewards versus the case with no rewards.
This utility o¤set will only be a factor in the case where the public is allowed to voice their approval or
disapproval, i.e., where social judgment is possible. These observations lead us to the following general
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 In our Visible Externalities treatments, social judgment will be less e¤ective at inducing
additional whistleblowing with monetary rewards than without rewards.
A potential consequence of crowding out is that nancial incentives may be less e¤ective, or even
counterproductive, at eliciting additional whistleblowing when whistleblowers are subject to social judg-
ment than if crowding out were not present or if social judgment were not possible.
Finally, we note that our data might allow us to address how di¤erent environments ultimately a¤ect
manager malfeasance by altering the likelihood that illegal activity is detected and punished. We do not
have the richness of variation in incentives for managers that we have for employees in particular, the
manager is never directly exposed to social judgment. This makes our hypothesis with regard to manager
behavior straightforward.
Hypothesis 4 Managers will be less likely to break the law in treatments where whistleblowing is more
likely.
4 Results
We start by assessing the extent to which we were able to create social ties between members of the
same rm in the Stage One tasks that preceded the whistleblowing game. As a measure of the resulting
within-rm cohesion, we use the minimum e¤ort chosen by members of a rm in the coordination game
in Stage Two that followed our team-building tasks. A comparison of the average minimum e¤ort chosen
by members of a rm and the average minimum e¤ort chosen by members of the public, who did not
engage in team-building tasks,25 provides strong evidence of induced rm cohesion. The minimum e¤ort
chosen by members of rms is signicantly higher than the minimum e¤ort chosen by members of the
public (123.70 vs. 119.26; two-sided t-test p   value of 0:001).26 This nding suggests that we were
25As explained in Section 3.1, during the team-building stage of the experiment (Stage One) members of the public engaged
in the same tasks as the members of a rm, but their payo¤s were determined solely by their individual performance in
these tasks.
26 In the game, each member of a three-person group had to choose an e¤ort level in the [110, 170] range, with payo¤s
being determined by: [minimum e¤ort in the group 0.75*(own e¤ort)].
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successful in generating social cohesion and, possibly, in-group loyalty among members of a rm.27
In what follows, we present and discuss the core results of the paper: the e¤ects of our treatments
on employeeswillingness to blow the whistle against their manager (Section 4.1). We then present our
ndings on managerslaw-breaking behavior across treatments (Section 4.2). We conclude by describing
the members of the publics approval or disapproval of whistleblowers in the Social Judgment treatments
(Section 4.3).
4.1 The decision to blow the whistle
Overall, about 33% of employees decided to blow the whistle against their law-breaking managers. There
is considerable variation across treatments, with the percentage of whistleblowers ranging from 10% to
59%, as shown in Figure 2 and Table 2. Since the Visible Externalities and the Invisible Externalities
treatments simulate di¤erent types of illegal actions or di¤erent industries where the damages generated by
fraud to the public are either more or less di¢ cult to identify, we present the results obtained under the two
settings separately. A number of important results emerge from Figure 2 and Table 2. First, the presence
of nancial rewards seems to generally and substantially increase the prevalence of whistleblowing. This
holds both when whistleblowers are subject to social judgment and when they are not. The sole exception,
to which we return towards the end of this section, is that nancial rewards are ine¤ective when the
externalities caused by fraud are visible to the public and whistleblowers are shielded from social approval
or disapproval.
Second, whistleblowing is prevalent even when nancially costly and it varies substantially with
contextual variables having no direct earnings consequences. This implies that we are justied in our
desire to take into account non-pecuniary motivations when setting policies with regard to whistleblowing.
The observed behavior is mostly consistent with the idea that individuals care about social approval.
Indeed, the data shows that the possibility of social judgment has a di¤erent e¤ect on whistleblowing
depending on the visibility to the public of the costs imposed on them by manager malfeasance. In
particular, when the negative externalities caused by fraud are not visible to the public, the possibility of
social judgment, through expectations of social disapproval, tends to decrease employeeswillingness to
blow the whistle, whereas when negative externalities are visible to the public, social judgment generally
increases whistleblowing, possibly because whistleblowers expect to receive messages of social approval.
This is discernible from Figure 2 and Table 2 by considering all pairwise comparisons of the forms ( ,
, No Judgment) and (, , Social Judgment). The lone exception occurs when negative externalities are
visible to the public but there are no whistleblower rewards.
Moving beyond simple pairwise comparisons, in Table 3 we report estimates from a linear probability
model where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the employee is willing to blow the whistle
and 0 otherwise. Table 5 in the Appendix reports estimates generated by probit regressions. In the
rst two columns, we split our data by the visibility of negative externalities for clarity, as behavior was
substantially di¤erent across this dimension. In column 3, we pool our data across all treatments and
27Recall that subjects played the same minimum e¤ort task in Stage Four, following the whistleblowing game, as we
aimed to test whether the occurrence of whistleblowing would a¤ect rm cohesion. However, the low occurrence of actual
whistleblowing in the game prevented us from conducting such analysis. This is because whistleblowing could only occur if
the manager broke the law and if the employee randomly chosen (with a 50% chance) to determine payo¤s was willing to
blow the whistle. In practice, this occurred in only 3 out of 103 cases/rms. A simple comparison of the Stage 2 and Stage
4 minimum e¤ort tasks shows a decline in the minimum e¤ort observed both within rms (123.70 vs. 121.77, one-tailed
p=0.080) and within members of the public (119.26 vs.116.67, one-tailed p=0.072).
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Figure 2: Whistleblowing across treatments.
No Judgment No Judgment Social Judgment Social Judgment
& No Reward & Reward & No Reward & Reward
Invisible Externalities 19.23% 58.82% 9.09% 40.00%
H0: Reward = No Reward p-value = 0.002 (0.003) if Judgment=0 p-value = 0.019 (0.030) if Judgment=1
H0: No Judgment = Judgment p-value =0.321 (0.429) if Rewards=0 p-value = 0.181 (0.260) if Rewards=1
Visible Externalities 22.73% 20.83% 17.86% 56.67%
H0: Reward = No Reward p-value = 0.876 (1.000) if Judgment=0 p-value = 0.002 (0.003) if Judgment=1
H0: No Judgment = Judgment p-value = 0.669 (0.732) if Rewards=0 p-value = 0.008 (0.012) if Rewards=1
Note: P-values are generated by Chi-square tests. P-values from Fisher exact tests in parentheses.
Table 2: Whistleblowing under di¤erent treatments
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Dep. Variable:
Dummy equal to 1 if employee is willing to blow the whistle, 0 otherwise
Invisible Ext. Visible Ext. All All All All
Rewards 0.36*** 0.21** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.40*** 0.36***
(0.064) (0.079) (0.063) (0.063) (0.075) (0.072)
Social Judgment -0.15* 0.16* -0.15** -0.16** -0.10 -0.14
(0.068) (0.079) (0.067) (0.065) (0.072) (0.082)
Visible Externalities -0.10 -0.11 0.03 0.00
(0.091) (0.090) (0.071) (0.077)
Visible x Reward -0.15 -0.15 -0.41*** -0.36***
(0.100) (0.099) (0.093) (0.097)
Visible x Social Judgment 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.05 0.10
(0.103) (0.112) (0.091) (0.113)
Social Judgment x Reward -0.09 -0.03
(0.129) (0.131)
Judgment x Reward x Visible 0.49*** 0.40**
(0.156) (0.174)
Firm performance/Own performance -0.17** -0.15**
(0.070) (0.071)
Constant 0.21*** 0.11 0.21*** 0.26 0.19*** 0.19
(0.052) (0.077) (0.051) (0.313) (0.058) (0.321)
Controls No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 102 104 206 206 206 206
Controls are: gender, economics major, number of rms in the session, ratio between rm performance and own
performance in team building task, and e¤ort chosen in minimum e¤ort task. We report the only control variable that
is signicant: the ratio between rm performance and own performance in the team building task. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the session level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, * * p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3: Treatment e¤ects
include interaction terms between the Reward and Social Judgment treatment dummies and the Visible
Externality dummy. In column 4, we additionally include a set of control variables that include gender,
whether the subject is an economics major and the number of rms in the session. In order to proxy
for employeesloyalty to the rm, our set of controls also includes the ratio between rm performance
and own performance in stage one of the experiment and the e¤ort level chosen in the minimum e¤ort
game of stage two. The former variable captures the extent to which each employee may feel indebted
to the other rm members for the earnings accumulated during the team-building stage, while the latter
variable is a measure of rm cohesion, plausibly capturing trust and cooperation among rm members.
In the nal two columns, for completeness we include all interactions between our treatment dummies as
well as a triple interaction term.
The rst pattern that becomes apparent in Table 3 is that rewards have a substantial and statistically
signicant main e¤ect on whistleblowing. The marginal e¤ect of nancial rewards is to increase the
prevalence of whistleblowing by about 36 percentage points when the negative externalities of fraud are
not visible to the public. Even when the externalities are visible to the public (columns 2), the estimated
marginal e¤ect is positive and large in magnitude (21 percentage points). This is conrmed by the
estimates in columns 3 and 4. Table 6 in the Appendix reports the estimated marginal e¤ects of nancial
rewards under the di¤erent treatment conditions, as generated by the regression analysis displayed in
column 4 of Table 3.
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The estimates displayed in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 conrm that rewards are e¤ective under
invisible externalities and absent social judgment (rst row), and no less e¤ective in the presence of social
judgment (insignicant coe¢ cient of Reward x Social Judgmentin row 6). Moreover, the combination
of rewards with social judgment and visibility of negative externalities caused by fraud further increases
the likelihood of whistleblowing (positive and signicant coe¢ cient on the triple interaction in row 7).
The only case where nancial rewards are less e¤ective is when the negative externalities are visible to
the public in the absence of social judgment (negative and signicant coe¢ cient of Visible x Rewards
in row 4). We will return to the possible interpretation of this result at the end of this section. In order
to facilitate the interpretation of the estimates reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, we report the
estimated marginal e¤ects of nancial rewards in all treatment conditions in the rst row of Table 7 in
Appendix.
Our rst result follows.
Result 1 Financial rewards generally increase employeeswillingness to blow the whistle against a law-
breaking manager.
From Table 3 we can also reconrm our impression of how the visibility of public harm interacts
with social judgment to a¤ect whistleblowing. In particular, either by considering Visible and Invisible
treatments separately (columns 1 and 2) or by pooling the data and inspecting the estimated interactions
between treatments, we can see that the possibility of social judgment substantially and signicantly de-
creases whistleblowing when the public is unaware of the costs imposed on them by manager malfeasance.
When these externalities are clear to the public, on the other hand, the possibility of social judgment
tends to increase whistleblowing. The marginal e¤ects of social judgment generated by the estimates in
column 4 of Table 3 reported in the second row of Table 6 in Appendix show that the possibility of
social judgment decreases whistleblowing by 16 percentage points if the externalities are not visible to
the public, while increasing it by the same percentage points if the externalities are visible to the public.
Separating out the e¤ects of all our treatment manipulations by interacting the di¤erent treatment
dummies in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 conrms our main social judgment results, yet it also shows that
the possibility of social judgment increases whistleblowing when the externalities are visible only in the
presence of nancial rewards (insignicant coe¢ cient of Visible x Social Judgmentin row 5; signicant
and positive coe¢ cient of the triple interaction in row 7).28 These observations lead to our second result.
Result 2 (a) When the negative externalities generated by fraud are not visible to the public, the possi-
bility of social judgment decreases whistleblowing.
(b) When the negative externalities generated by fraud are visible to the public, the possibility of social
judgment either has no impact or increases whistleblowing.
Result 2 suggests that individuals in our experiment directly value social (dis)approval and that they
expect social approval to be more likely when the public realizes manager malfeasance directly harms
them and whistleblowers are nancially rewarded. On the other hand, when whistleblowing might be
interpreted as disloyalty toward the rm, an anti-social act, the result suggests employees expect public
scrutiny to entail social disapproval.
28See also the marginal e¤ects displayed in the second row of Table 7. While social judgment seems to have a negative
e¤ect on whistleblowing under invisible externalities, both with or without rewards (the coe¢ cients are close to conventional
levels of statistical signicance) and a positive e¤ect under visible externalities and rewards, the impact is null under visible
externalities and no rewards.
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Next, we consider our third hypothesis: whether nancial incentives crowd out the salutary e¤ect
of social judgment on whistleblowing in our Visible Externalities treatments, which can be examined in
various ways. First, consider the raw data as presented in Figure 3, Panel b. The e¤ect of social judgment
without rewards is the di¤erence in heights between the third bar and rst bar, while the e¤ect of social
judgment with rewards would be the height di¤erence between the fourth and second bars. Crowding
out would be consistent with the latter di¤erence being smaller in magnitude than the former di¤erence.
However, this is clearly not the case. The gure suggests the e¤ect of social judgment without rewards is
essentially zero,29 while the e¤ect of social judgment with rewards is to increase whistleblowing by about
40 percentage points. More formally, the e¤ect of rewards on the e¤ect of social judgment in the Visible
Externalities treatments can be seen in Table 3. Conrming appearances from Figure 3, the positive and
signicant coe¢ cient in Column 6 on the triple interaction Judgment x Reward x Visiblealso suggests
that rewards increase the e¤ect of social judgment on whistleblowing by about 40 percentage points. All
together, our data provide little support for Hypothesis 3.
Result 3 Financial rewards do not weaken the e¤ect of Social Judgment, i.e., we nd no evidence of
crowding-out of non-pecuniary motivations linked to expectations of social (dis)approval.
Interestingly, however, we do nd evidence for a di¤erent type of crowding out. The negative and
signicant interaction between Visible Externalities and Reward in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 suggests
that, absent social judgment, rewards are less e¤ective in industries or cases of fraud where the public
feels that it is directly a¤ected by managers law-breaking behavior. This pattern is also apparent in
Figure 2, when comparing the rst two bars in the left panel to the same two bars in the right panel:
rewards strongly increase whistleblowing when whistleblowing is not subject to social judgment in the
invisible externalities case, but have no e¤ect when externalities are visible. Thus, in the absence of social
judgment, externality visibility alters the e¤ect of nancial rewards.
Since we did not design our experiment to focus on this type of crowding out, we can only speculate
about the underlying mechanism. One possibility is that individualsintrinsic motivations associated with
whistleblowing are higher when the externalities are visible to the public; in this case, the introduction of
nancial rewards, absent public scrutiny, crowds out these motivations, resulting in an overall null e¤ect of
rewards. Another possibility is that the moral environment is more complex than we have been assuming
and that, for example, whistleblowers learn about their own motivations through their actions  they
self-signal, in the terminology of Benabou and Tirole (2006). In this setting, when the whistleblower
knows that the public is not aware of the costs imposed on them, blowing the whistle simply expresses
a preference for justice or fairness punishing the manager for bad behavior. When the whistleblower
knows the public is aware of the harm imposed on them, motivations become more di¢ cult to disentangle
and, in particular, the choosing sides aspect  i.e., empathizing more with the public than with the
in-group (rm) becomes more salient. Abstaining from whistleblowing would then become a self-signal
about loyalty to the rm, made stronger by forgoing nancial rewards, which might generate the pattern
observed in the data. In Appendix Section B we discuss more formally how the pattern can be explained
in our simple theoretical framework.
29To see how this null result could be explained in the context of our theoretical framework, please refer to the Appendix,
Section B.
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Figure 3: Manager law-breaking across treatments
4.2 Managers Law-Breaking Behavior
Our experiment was primarily meant to investigate employeesdecision to blow the whistle against their
manager. As a consequence, our sample of managers is quite small, with a total of 103 observations.
Overall, about 8% of managers decided to break the law to double the rm fund at the expense of the
members of the public. The occurrence of law-breaking varies across treatments, as shown in Figure 4.
Table 8 in Appendix reports the law-breaking statistics by treatment and the p-values generated by Chi-
square tests. A clear pattern we see in the data is the reduction in managersillegal behavior when there
exist nancial rewards for whistleblowers, suggesting that managers expect rewards to increase employees
willingness to report wrongdoing and that, consequently, whistleblower rewards may have substantial
preventive or deterrent e¤ects on corporate crime. However, the small sample size and generally low
frequency of law-breaking preclude us from investigating further the underlying pattern.
Result 4 There are no statistically signicant di¤erences in manager law-breaking across treatments,
although the amount of law breaking appears lower in the presence of rewards for whistleblowers.
We can investigate another determinant of manager behavior, however. Regression analysis30 pro-
vides evidence of the impact of the managers skills on the probability of breaking the law. In particular,
the managers performance in the stage one multiplication task is negatively related to the probability
the manager breaks the law. This nding seems in line with Baloria et al. (2015), who document that the
companies that lobbied against the whistleblower rewards provision in the Dodd-Frank Act were precisely
the less well run companies with weaker compliance programs and poorer governance structures (e.g., less
separation between Chairman and CEO). These are also the rms for which whistleblower rewards are
30The corresponding table is not reported here but is available from the authors upon request. The estimates also show
that none of the treatments had a signcant impact on the managers decision to break the law.
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Figure 4: Social judgment of four whistleblowing cases (survey)
perceived by the market to be more needed and more likely to have positive e¤ects in terms of improving
management/governance and protecting shareholders.
4.3 Social Judgment of Whistleblowers
In this section, we investigate the social judgment of whistleblowers under di¤erent conditions. We
start by analyzing individual answers to post-experiment survey questions eliciting opinions on the social
appropriateness or inappropriateness of actual whistleblowing cases. As part of our post-experiment
survey, all study participants were presented with four actual whistleblowing cases the Snowden case,
the Enron case, the UBS case and the Tenet case and asked to evaluate the social appropriateness of
blowing the whistle in each case. As discussed in Section 3.1, we chose these cases because they vary in
the visibility of the negative externalities that illegal behavior caused to the public and in the presence
of nancial rewards for the whistleblower. The social costs of the unlawful actions unmasked by the
whistleblower are clearly visible in the Snowden (national security) and the Tenet (health care) cases,
less visible in the UBS (tax evasion) case and even less visible in the Enron (earnings management) case.
Moreover, nancial rewards were present in the UBS and Tenet cases and not in the Enron and Snowden
cases.31
Figure 3 reports the percentages of survey participants stating that the decision made by the whistle-
blower is socially acceptable. The social acceptability of whistleblowing is lowest in the Enron case and
highest in the Tenet case (p = 0:000). Pairwise comparisons between cases suggest that both the visibility
of the externalities and the presence of nancial rewards may be responsible for the observed increase
in the social acceptability of the whistleblowing act. Naturally, this is only suggestive evidence. Next,
we analyze the messages that the members of the public sent to whistleblowers in our social judgment
treatments.
31 In order to minimize ordering e¤ects, the four cases were presented in the above order, but not one after the other.
Subjects were rst presented with the Snowden case and were then asked a number of unrelated questions collecting
demographics and attitudinal preferences, they then saw the Enron case, followed by more unrelated questions. The UBS
case came afterwards, followed by more questions before the appearance of the Tenet case. For each whistleblowing scenario,
we provided a summary of the case and we asked subjects to rank the appropriateness of the whistleblowers decision.
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Invisible Externalities Visible Externalities
Happy Neutral No message Unhappy Happy Neutral No message Unhappy
No Reward 72.22% 5.56% 11.11% 11.11% 38.89% 33.33% 22.22% 5.56%
Reward 77.78% 5.56% 16.27% 0% 62.50% 16.67% 20.83% 0%
Table 4: Percentages of Members of the Public that sent each kind of message to whistleblowers
Overall, across all treatments, 18% of members of the public decided to send no message to the
whistleblowers, 63% sent a message of approval, 4% sent a message of disapproval, and the remaining
15% sent a neutral message. Table 4 reports the percentages of members of the public that sent each
possible message, or no message, under the di¤erent treatment manipulations. The presence of rewards
seems to induce the members of the public to (not)send (frowny)smiley faces to whistleblowers, especially
when the externalities are visible to the public (p = 0:13). This is in line with our nding of the positive
impact of rewards on whistleblowing, and suggests that potential whistleblowers correctly anticipated
that the presence of nancial rewards would not negatively a¤ect the judgment that members of the
public would have of them. A plausible interpretation of this result is that rewards signal to the public
the right thing to do,as suggested by legal theories on the expressive role of the law (e.g. Sunstein,
1996).
Contrary to our expectations, the visibility of the social cost of fraud does not lead to increased social
approval of whistleblowers. If anything, when the public is aware of the monetary loss that they su¤er
because of manager rule-breaking, they are less likely to send smiley faces to whistleblowers (p = 0:044 in
the no rewards treatments and p = 0:289 in the rewards treatments). This is a puzzling nding that may
either indicate that members of the public somehow held the whistleblower responsible for their monetary
loss as they saw him/her as a member of the fraudulent rm or that the members of the public see
the messages as tools to express their general feelings, i.e., either satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
outcomes of the experiment. While this is less than ideal, as we would rather have the members of the
public view and use the messages as instruments to express approval or disapproval of whistleblowers,
the analysis of the publics messaging behavior is only tangentially relevant to our investigation. In fact,
what matters for our research question is the whisteblowersanticipation of the messages of approval or
disapproval that they would receive under the di¤erent treatment manipulations.
5 Conclusion
Our study contributes to the policy debate and growing literature on the motivations and incentives for
employees to blow the whistle on corporate fraud. Despite being splashed across the covers of popular
journals in recent years, whistleblowing is rare and the vast majority of white-collar crime remains
undetected and unpunished (Dyck et al., 2013). In this paper, we examined two policies that may motivate
employees to blow the whistle on white-collar crime: the use of nancial rewards, and the protection
(exposure) of whistleblowers from (to) public scrutiny and social judgment. We also examined the
interaction between these two sources of whistleblowing incentives and tested whether nancial rewards
may crowd out non-pecuniary motivations linked to expectations of social approval. Finally, we asked
whether di¤erent policies should be used for di¤erent cases of fraud or di¤erent industries, depending on
whether the public feels directly a¤ected by the negative externalities generated by the illegal activities
undertaken within the organization, as discussed in the legal debate.
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We employed a specially designed laboratory experiment that allowed us to observe willingness to
break the law, willingness to blow the whistle on rule breaking, and public reaction to whistleblowing.
Crucially, in our setting, manager wrongdoing caused nancial losses to realthird parties, while poten-
tial whistleblowers did not take part in the illegal activities but beneted from them, and whistleblowing
was costly.
We found strong evidence of the e¤ectiveness of nancial rewards on whistleblowing. We did not
nd evidence of crowding out of non-pecuniary motivations driven by a preference for social approval.
Our data also show that nancial rewards are more e¤ective when the whistleblower is subject to social
judgment than when he/she is not. Our ndings with respect to the relationship between whistleblowing
and public scrutiny show that the possibility of social judgment may act as either an incentive for, or
a deterrent against, blowing the whistle. Social judgment acts as a deterrent when the public does
not feel directly a¤ected by the negative externalities caused by corporate fraud, and may act as an
incentive when the opposite holds. This suggests that, in order to maximize whistleblowing, industries
and corresponding cases of fraud should be classied based on the perceived negative e¤ects they have on
the public and di¤erent policies should be adopted, either protecting or exposing whistleblowers. Overall,
our results conrm previous research on the e¤ectiveness of nancial rewards for whistleblowing and
provide novel insights about the interaction between nancial incentives and whistleblowers concerns
about social judgment.
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APPENDIX
In this section we construct an ad-hoc framework which incorporates two forms of non-pecuniary
concerns likely to play a role in whistleblowing. In this framework, an individuals overall utility is a
function of money, personal moral concerns and social approval. We assume no necessary relationship
between social approval and morality. Actions that garner social approval may not be moral, according
to an individuals own moral standards, and vice-versa.
Each employee has two possible actions: blow the whistle, which we denoted by w, or remaining
silent, :w. Employees also have subjective beliefs about which of these actions is moral given the context,
c, and which will garner social approval. Beliefs in our framework take a particularly simple form: with
probability p(c), the employee believes that w is the moral action in the current context; and with the
remaining probability, 1   p(c), s/he believes that :w is the moral action. Similarly, beliefs about the
probability that w (:w) will garner social approval are given by q(c) (1  q(c)).
We assume that overall utility is composed of three components: money utility, moral utility and
social (approval) utility. For the money utility component, we assume risk neutrality so that u($x) = x.
For the moral utility component, taking the moral (immoral) action raises (lowers) utility by one unit,
so that in expectation the moral utility of w is given by p(c)  1 + (1   p(c))  ( 1) = 2p(c)   1. The
social utility component takes a similar form, so that in expectation social utility of w is 2q(c)  1.
There is heterogeneity in the population of employees with regard to how much weight moral and
social concerns carry in decision making. We represent these weights with idiosyncratic parameters i  0
and i  0, with cumulative distribution functions M;S. The associated density functions, m; s, have
nite support on the non-negative reals. Employee is overall utility from blowing the whistle or remaining
silent can be written as:
Ui(w; p; q; c) = x(w) + i(2p(c)  1) + i(2q(c)  1);
Ui(:w; p; q; c) = x(:w) + i(1  2p(c)) + i(1  2q(c)):
In these equations we write p; q as functions of the context, c, which we manipulate with our experi-
mental treatments. We assume that social approval is more likely when the public knows they are being
harmed and that, in contexts without the possibility of social judgment, social utility does not enter into
decision-making. Rather than introducing an indicator function for the presence of social judgment in
this latter case, for notational simplicity we simply set q = 12 when social judgment is not possible.
q(Visible Externalities) > q(Invisible Externalities);
q(No Judgment) = 12 :
We assume that by creating rm loyalty through the Identity Building stage of our experiment, that
in each context (at least some) employees will believe that whistleblowing is the immoral action:
p(c) < 12 for each c, for some employees.
A Whistleblowing in our framework
In the discussion that follows, we suppress the dependence of p; q on context in our notation for ease of
exposition. We also ignore knife-edge cases of exact indi¤erence between whistleblowing and not.
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A.1 Baseline case: no direct interactions among utility components
To begin familiarizing ourselves with the framework while investigating what it might say about whistle-
blowing, we begin with a very simple case. Here we assume that there are no direct interactions among
the three components of utility monetary, moral and social. This rules out, e.g., any direct e¤ect of
monetary rewards on the morality of whistleblowing (p) or the likelihood of social approval (q).
We can characterize the likelihood of whistleblowing as the probability that the utility of whistle-
blowing exceeds the utility of remaining silent. Using our expressions for the utility of each action above,
this probability is governed by the threshold:
x(w)  x(:w) > 2[i(1  2p) + i(1  2q)]: (1)
Notice that p and q, the probabilities that whistleblowing is moral and will induce social approval,
respectively enter with a negative sign into the RHS of the inequality. Thus, the RHS can be interpreted
as the moral and social costs of whistleblowing, while the LHS represents the net monetary benet of
whistleblowing. An employee therefore blows the whistle whenever the net monetary benet exceeds the
subjective non-monetary costs of whistleblowing.
From Equation 1, it is clear that monetary rewards for whistleblowers strictly increase the LHS of the
equation without directly a¤ecting the RHS. Thus, for a given p; q;M and S, (weakly) more employees
will nd whistleblowing to be the utility-maximizing action. This leads us to our rst observation: absent
any direct e¤ect of rewards on moral or social concerns, an increase in monetary whistleblower rewards
(weakly) increases the likelihood of whistleblowing in the population. The amount of an increase in
whistleblowing, if any, will depend on the distribution of decision weights given to moral and social
concerns, M and S.
Observation 1 Increasing monetary rewards (weakly) increases the likelihood of whistleblowing.
Next, we focus on the RHS of 1. Notice that the RHS is strictly increasing in 1  p, the subjective
likelihood that whistleblowing is immoral, as well as 1  q, the subjective likelihood of social disapproval.
Consequently, contextual factors which increase p or q will reduce the RHS. For a given level of monetary
rewards, then, an increase in either p or q will weakly increase the population probability of blowing the
whistle. The level of the increase will depend again on the distribution of the moral and social decision
weights in the population.
We have assumed above that one contextual factor that increases the subjective likelihood of social
approval is the visibility of externalities. Suppose we make the additional assumptions that q(Visible Externalities) >
1
2 > q(Invisible Externalities). In words these assumptions say that the public (on average) approves of
whistleblowing when it knows about the harm imposed upon it by manager malfeasance; and when it
does not know about this harm it disapproves. These assumptions tell us that when social concerns
enter the employees utility function in our Social Judgment treatments these concerns increase (de-
crease) the RHS of Equation 1 when when externalities are invisible (visible). Our second observation
is therefore that social judgment will weakly increase the prevalence of whistleblowing in the population
when externalities are visible compared to the case with no social judgment; and, compared to the no
judgement case, when externalities are invisible social judgment will weakly decrease the prevalence of
whistleblowing.32
32Notice that absent the additional assumptions about q crossing the threshold of 1
2
, we would still have an implication
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Observation 2 Social judgment weakly (decreases) increases whistleblowing when externalities are
(invisible) visible.
A.2 Relaxing the no direct interactions assumption
Our rst two observations above relied on the assumption that there were no interactions among the three
components of utility. To see the complications inherent in relaxing this assumption, consider assuming a
negative interaction between morality and social approval. Suppose we assume that whenever p increases
q decreases and vice-versa. Then even though it is reasonable to also assume that visible externalities
increase the likelihood of social approval, we could rationalize any observed change in whistleblowing
with an ancillary assumption about the strength of the negative e¤ect of q on p. If social judgment
with visible externalities actually decreases whistleblowing, we could rationalize this with a more-than-
o¤setting decrease in the morality of whistleblowing.
Consequently, we are cautious in relying on interactions among monetary and non-monetary com-
ponents, focusing only on the most straightforward interaction in this section. Specically, we examine a
particular reduced-form way of incorporating crowding out.A frequently raised concern is that mone-
tary incentives may crowd out non-monetary incentives. An obvious and straightforward way to capture
this concern in our framework is to assume a negative relationship between the monetary gain from
whistleblowing, x(w), and either the moral or social utility components of utility. While the analysis
would be essentially the same for either of these components, the justication is more straightforward
for the latter. We also restrict attention to the Visible Externalities case, where social judgment should
generally increase the prevalence of whistleblowing.
To incorporate crowding out, we assume that there is a negative relationship between monetary
rewards and q, the employees belief that whistleblowing will induce social approval. Thus higher mone-
tary rewards reduce the employeesexpectations of social approval. This could be because the employee
believes the public is more likely to attribute whistleblowing to greed when there are rewards than if
there were no rewards, and greed is socially disapproved of.
For concreteness x the monetary consequences of whistleblowing at 5, with rewards or  5, without
rewards. Let p = 14 and the distribution of i be degenerate with point mass 6. Let i be uniformly
distributed on [0; 10]. Denote by q the likelihood of social approval without rewards and by q0 < q the
likelihood of social approval with rewards. In particular, assume that without rewards whistleblowing is
certainly met with social approval (q = 1), but that when whistleblowers receive nancial rewards social
approval is only slightly more likely than disapproval: q0 = 53100 .
We can compute the e¤ectiveness of social approval without rewards as the di¤erence in the probabil-
ity of whistleblowing with and without social judgment. Given our assumptions, without social judgment
and without rewards, whistleblowing never occurs:  5 < 2i(1   2p) = 6. But with social judgement,
whistleblowing occurs whenever:
 5 > 2[i(1  2p) + i(1  2q)] = 6  2i:
Consequently, employees with i > frac112 blow the whistle. The e¤ectiveness of social judgment
is therefore to increase the probability of whistleblowing by 920 .
of the visibility of externalities. However, we would only know that social judgment would be less e¤ective at inducing
additional whistleblowing in the population when externalities are invisible than when externalities are visible.
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We can repeat the same exercise with rewards. Again, without social judgment whistleblowing never
occurs because 5 < 2i(1 2p) = 6. With social judgment, however, employees blow the whistle whenever:
5 > 6 + 2i(1  2q0)] = 6  i
12
100
:
This inequality is satised for i > 8
1
3 . The e¤ectiveness of social judgment when there are rewards is
therefore to increase the probability of whistleblowing by 530 .
Since 530 is much smaller than
9
20 , we see how the addition of monetary rewards in the case where
rewards directly reduce the likelihood of social approval may crowd out the e¤ectiveness of social judg-
ment.
Observation 3 Crowding out can be explained by a negative interaction between rewards and
social judgment in our framework.
It is also important to notice that crowding out in the sense just mentioned is not a necessary
consequence of a negative interaction between rewards and social approval in our framework. Reducing
the e¤ectiveness of social judgment requires a conuence of features that depend on the size of monetary
rewards, the distribution of the social utility parameter , and the strength of the negative interaction.
For instance, if we keep all the parameters of our example above but use a slightly higher q0 = 610 , then
the e¤ectiveness of social judgment with rewards can be calculated to be 34 , which is greater than
9
20 , the
e¤ect without rewards.
Rather than considering all other possible interactions and their implications for whistleblowing, we
now turn directly to relating our framework to our experimental results.
B Relating our experimental results to our framework
In this section, we relate our framework to our experimental results. We begin by describing how we
believe our treatments relate to the parameters of our framework.
We assume that the distribution of i and i in the population was xed and not a¤ected by our
treatments. Through our identity-building exercise we attempted to create a moral tension between being
disloyal to ones rm (low p) and exposing illegal activity (high p). We assume the overall e¤ect is to
make whistleblowing on average immoral for at least some employees.
The primary parameters we sought to manipulate were the likelihood of social approval, q, and
monetary rewards. We implemented two levels of monetary rewards for whistleblowing, one positive and
one negative. In our No Rewards treatments, the monetary consequences of blowing the whistle were
x(w) =  $5, while not blowing the whistle yielded x(:w) = $0. In our Rewards treatments, x(w) = $5
while x(:w) = $0. We attempted to manipulate employees beliefs about q indirectly by varying whether
the public was aware of the harm done to them by the managers illegal behavior. In particular, we
interpret our Visible Externalities treatments as the employeessubjective belief they will receive social
approval, q, as the public is more likely to view whistleblowers as acting on their behalf. On the other
hand, we assume that in our Invisible Externalities treatments the employee may believe that the public
may view whistleblowing as an act of disloyalty, thus decreasing q.
Given this description, we rst note than many of our results are clearly consistent with the simplest
form of our framework  without interactions among the components of utility. We observed above
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that in this simplest case monetary rewards generally increase whistleblowing (Observation 1 above and
Result 1 in the text). Also in this case, we have shown that our framework is consistent with social
judgment either increasing or decreasing whistleblowing according to the likelihood of social approval or
disapproval (Observation 2, Result 2). Turning to the case with interactions among utility components,
we also observed the absence of evidence for crowding out (Result 3) is consistent with our framework 
as would have been evidence for crowding out (Observation 3). Finally, the evidence we nd for crowding
out in our No Judgment treatments, mentioned at the end of Section 4.1 in the paper, is also consistent
with our framework as noted above.
To be more concrete, we provide a numerical example illustrating how our framework can be made
consistent with a particular pattern in our data.
B.1 A contrived numerical example
In this numerical example, we demonstrate that our simple framework, without interactions among
motivations, can accommodate the pattern of social judgment being more e¤ective at inducing whistle-
blowing when combined with monetary rewards than without monetary rewards. Assume for simplicity
that whistleblowing is certainly immoral but likely to garner social approval: p = 0; q = 45 . That is,
whistleblowing is more likely to induce social approval than disapproval, which is plausible in out Visible
Externalities treatments. Suppose that our remaining experimental factors a¤ect neither p nor q. Finally,
assume that that the moral concern distribution is degenerate with Prob(i = 3) = m(3) = 1, while social
approval concerns are non-degenerate, being distributed uniformly on the interval [0; 9].
The net monetary utility from whistleblowing is  5 in our No Rewardstreatments, while in our
Rewards treatments, this net monetary utility is +5. Given these parameters, in our No Rewards
treatments social judgment is completely ine¤ective at increasing whistleblowing. No employee is willing
to blow the whistle without social judgment:
 5 < 2[i(1  2p) = 2 3 = 6:
With social judgment, it is also the case that no employees are willing to blow the whistle. For all
i 2 [0; 9]:
 5 < 2[3 + i(1  2q)] = 6 
3
5
i:
In our Rewardstreatments, however, social judgment is e¤ective at inducing whistleblowing. We
construct the same calculations as above. The only thing that has changed is the net monetary utility of
whistleblowing, which is now 5 rather than  5. Without social judgment, we still have no whistleblowing,
since
5 < 2[i(1  2p)] = 2 3 1 = 6:
With social judgment, however, for a substantial range of is the net monetary utility of whistle-
blowing now outweighs the moral and social costs. We can calculate the probability of whistleblowing to
be:
Prob(5 > 2[3 + i(1  2
4
5
)]) = 1  S(5
6
)  90:7%:
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All together, in our numerical example social judgment is completely ine¤ective at inducing whistle-
blowing without monetary rewards. In stark contrast, adding monetary rewards makes social judgment
almost completely e¤ective, increasing the population propensity to blow the whistle by over 90 percent-
age points.
We now turn to a pattern that is not transparently consistent with our simple framework and explain
some ways the framework could be extended to incorporate the pattern.
B.2 A puzzling pattern
A pattern in our data that appears at rst glance puzzling occurs in the context of no social judgment.
When there is no possibility of social judgment, our data suggest that monetary rewards are ine¤ective at
inducing whistleblowing in our Visible Externalities treatments, but quite e¤ective when externalities are
not visible. This is puzzling because, since there is no social judgment, the social approval component of
utility should not matter, but this is precisely the only component that should be a¤ected by the visibility
of externalities. Consequently, to explain this pattern in our framework we would need a plausible story
relying on the moral component of overall utility and allow for some type direct e¤ect of our treatments on
our framework parameters, or interaction among them, that we have not yet considered. We provide two
plausible examples of how our framework could be plausibly extended to incorporate even this puzzling
pattern.
One such, hopefully plausible but necessarily ad hoc, story relies on allowing p to vary with the
visibility of externalities. Suppose that
p(Visible Externalities) < p(Invisible Externalities):
This could be the case because when it is clear that the employee knows the public knows it is being
harmed, choosing to blow the whistle might feel more like choosing sides between the rm and the public
than when the public is uninformed. If this were the case, then we could easily construct an example
consistent the puzzling pattern. For instance, reconsider the parameters from our numerical example
above, except now suppose that:
p(Visible Externalities) = 0;
p(Invisible Externalities) = 16 :
When externalities are visible, the moral cost of whistleblowing is
maxf 5; 5g < 2[i(1  2p(Visible Externalities)] = 6:
In words, the net monetary benet either 5 or  5 never outweighs the moral cost of whistleblowing.
Consequently, monetary rewards are completely ine¤ective at inducing whistleblowing.
However, when externalities are not visible:
 5 < 2[i(1  2p(Visible Externalities) = 4 < 5:
While no employees blow the whistle without rewards ( 5 < 4), all employees blow the whistle when
there are whistleblower rewards (5 > 4). Thus, when there is no possibility of social judgment, rewards
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are completely e¤ective in treatments when externalities are invisible but completely ine¤ective when
externalities are visible.
Another plausible story can be constructed if we allow the morality of whistleblowing, p, to depend
directly on both rewards and the visibility of externalities. In particular, assume that the monetary
rewards generally lower p, which can be a reduced-form way to capture one form of crowding out.
Suppose also that visible externalities generally increase the morality of whistleblowing. Finally suppose
that when externalities are not visible, whistleblowing is already maximally immoral, so that p = 0
irrespective of rewards. The following values of p capture this story:
p(Visible Externalities, Rewards) = 0;
p(Visible Externalities, No Rewards) = 34 ;
p(Invisible Externalities, Rewards) = 0;
p(Invisible Externalities, No Rewards) = 0:
Assume i is no longer degenerate, but rather is distributed uniformly on [0; 3]. Consider rst the
case with invisible externalities. When there are no rewards, no employee blows the whistle since the
monetary benet of whistleblowing is always negative but the moral cost is always positive. When there
are rewards, employees with i <
5
2 blow the whistle. This occurs with probability
5
6 . Therefore, the
overall e¤ectiveness of rewards when there is no social judgment and when externalities are invisible is
increase the probability of whistleblowing by 56 .
Contrast this with the visible externalities case. With rewards, p = 0 again so that the condition for
employee whistleblowing is identical to the one we just calculated i <
5
2 . Consequently, with rewards
whistleblowing occurs with probability 56 . Without rewards, whistleblowing is more likely to be moral
than immoral: p = 34 . The condition for whistleblowing in this case boils down to i < 5, which occurs
with probability one in our example. Consequently, when there is no social judgment but externalities
are visible rewards increase the probability of whistleblowing by only 16 . In this sense, rewards are less
e¤ective at inducing additional whistleblowing when externalities are visible, just as we observe in our
data.
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APPENDIX TABLES
Dep. Variable:
Dummy equal to 1 if employee is willing to blow the whistle, 0 otherwise
Invisible Ext. Visible Ext. All All All All
Rewards 1.09*** 0.61*** 1.09*** 1.07*** 1.09*** 1.01***
(0.203) (0.229) (0.199) (0.208) (0.239) (0.228)
Social Judgment -0.47** 0.47** -0.47** -0.47** -0.47 -0.54
(0.214) (0.230) (0.210) (0.208) (0.329) (0.360)
Visible Externalities -0.25 -0.27 0.12 0.05
(0.304) (0.314) (0.249) (0.267)
Visible x Reward -0.48 -0.49 -1.16*** -1.07***
(0.300) (0.312) (0.301) (0.303)
Visible x Social Judgment 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.29 0.38
(0.309) (0.339) (0.382) (0.444)
Social Judgment x Reward -0.01 0.15
(0.427) (0.450)
Judgment x Reward x Visible 1.16** 0.99*
(0.505) (0.571)
Firm performance/Own performance -0.58** -0.57*
(0.275) (0.294)
Constant -0.87*** -1.11*** -0.87*** -0.57 -0.87*** -0.67
(0.184) (0.250) (0.181) (1.041) (0.207) (1.093)
Controls No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 102 104 206 206 206 206
Note: We report estimates from probit regressions. Controls are: gender, economics major, number of rms in the session, ratio between
rm performance and own performance in team building task, and e¤ort chosen in minimum e¤ort task. We report the only control
variable that is signicant: the ratio between rm performance and own performance in the team building task. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the session level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, * * p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Probit regressions
Under Invisible Externalities Under Visible Externalities
The E¤ect of Rewards 0.35*** 0.20**
(0.000) (0.015)
The E¤ect of Social judgment -0.16** 0.16*
(0.023) (0.078)
Note: We report the marginal e¤ects corresponding to the linear combinations of the estimated coe¢ cients
displayed in column 4 of Table 3. p-values in parentheses.
Table 6: Estimated marginal e¤ects
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Under Invisible Externalities Under Visible Externalities
With No Judgment With Soc. Judgment With No Judgment With Soc. Judgment
The E¤ect of Rewards 0.36*** 0.33*** -0.003 0.40**
(0.000) (0.007) (0.959) (0.017)
With No Reward With Reward With No Reward With Reward
The E¤ect of Social judgment -0.14 -0.16 -0.03 0.37**
(0.106) (0.123) (0.627) (0.027)
Note: We report the marginal e¤ects corresponding to the linear combinations of the estimated coe¢ cients displayed in column 6
of Table 3. p-values in parentheses.
Table 7: Estimated marginal e¤ects by sub-treatment
No Judgment No Judgment Social Judgment Social Judgment
& No Reward & Reward & No Reward & Reward
Invisible Externalities 15.38% 11.76% 9.09% 0.00%
H0: Reward = No Reward p-value = 0.773 (1.000) if if Judgment=0 p-value = 0.329 (1.000) if if Judgment=1
H0: No Judgment = Soc. Judgment p-value =0.642 (1.000) if Rewards=0 p-value = 0.260 (0.516) if Rewards=1
Visible Externalities 9.09% 0.00% 7.14% 6.67%
H0: Reward = No Reward p-value = 0.286 (0.478) if if Judgment=0 p-value = 0.968 (1.000) if if Judgment=1
H0: No Judgment = Soc. Judgment p-value = 0.859 (1.000) if Rewards=0 p-value = 0.362 (1.000) if Rewards=1
Note: We report the marginal e¤ects corresponding to the linear combinations of the estimated coe¢ cients displayed in column 8
of Table 3. P-values are generated by Chi-square tests. P-values from Fisher exact tests in parentheses. The decline observed
when the externalities are visible is also not statistically signicant.
Table 8: Managers law-breaking behavior
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